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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code 78-2a-3(2)(g).

This appeal is from a final

order that disposes of all claims with respect to all parties.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did petitioner waive his Utah Constitutional rights by failing
to specifically object to the ORDER OF DISMISSAL on Utah
Constitutional grounds at the trial court?

2.

Does the three-month statute of limitations contained in Utah
Code § 78-12-31.1 violate petitioner's rights under the Utah
Constitution Article I Sections 1, 5, 7, 11, and 2 6?

3.

Was the trial court correct in dismissing petitioner's habeas
corpus petition for hearing dates prior to April 27, 1987?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
These are issues of law requiring no deference to the trial

court.

This court reviews for correctness, "correctness of error"

State v. Rhodes 818 P2d 1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991), Smith v. Cook
803 P2d 788, 790 (Utah 1990) (no deference).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Constitution Article I Section 1,
inherent and inalienable right to liberty
Utah Constitution Article I Section 5,
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
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Utah Constitution Article I Section 7,
no deprivation of liberty without due process
Utah Constitution Article I Section 11,
every person shall have a remedy by due course of law
Utah Constitution Article I Section 26,
provisions are mandatory and prohibitory
Utah Code § 78-12-31.1: Within three months: For relief
pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. This limitation shall
apply not only as to grounds known to petitioner but also to
grounds which in the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have been known by petitioner or counsel for petitioner.
Utah Code § 78-12-36, amended April 27, 1987,
disability of incarceration
Garcia v. Jorqenson, 910298-CA, (unpublished memorandum
decision May 18/92)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from Third District Judge Kenneth Rigtrup's
February 28, 1992 ORDER OF DISMISSAL, 91 090 6525 HC, wherein
Gibson's PETITION SEEKING EXTRAORDINARY WRIT of Habeas Corpus was
dismissed based on the 3-month statute of limitations in Utah Code
§§ 78-12-31.1 and 78-12-36 as amended April 27, 1987.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Petitioner Alan Gibson is prisoner 12937.

Foote v. Board of

Pardons 808 P2d 734 (Utah 1991) appeared Mar 14/91.

Gibson filed

a Pro Se PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT seven months later on Oct
16/91.

Counsel for Gibson was appointed on Nov 25/91.

PETITION was filed Jan 27/92 by appointed counsel.

An AMENDED

After a

hearing on Feb 24/92, District Court Judge Kenneth Rigtrup issued
an ORDER OF DISMISSAL on Feb 28/92 based on the three-month
statute of limitations in Utah Code § 78-12-31.1. At the hearing
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petitioner's counsel did not specifically object to the ORDER on
Utah Constitutional grounds.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The three month statute of limitations in Utah Code § 78-1231.1 violates petitioner's Utah Constitutional rights Article I
Sections 1, 5, 7, 11, and 26; and this denial is so basic that it
amounts to plain error.

Further, the ORDER OF DISMISSAL was

overly broad in sweeping away petitioner's rights to habeas corpus
review of Parol Board hearings that occurred prior to April 27,
19871.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
1

Did petitioner waive his Utah Constitutional rights by failing
to specifically object to the ORDER OF DISMISSAL on Utah
Constitutional grounds at the trial court?
In Garcia v. Jorqenson, 910298-CA, (unpublished memorandum

decision May 18/92) Garcia argued the 3-month statute of
limitations in Utah Code § 78-12-31.1 was unconstitutional.

But,

as in this case, Garcia had not raised the constitutionality of
the Utah Code at the trial court below.

This court affirmed the

trial court's dismissal of Garcia's petition for habeas corpus
saying "It is well-settled that this court does not review
constitutional issues for the first time on appeal absent plain
error or exceptional circumstances."

Id at 4, citing State v.

Archambeau, 880 P2d 920, 923-25 (Utah App. 1991).
1

What is not

The date §§ 78-12-31.1 and 78-12-3 6 were amended to limit
habeas corpus relief to 3-months from the time petitioner
knew or should have known of grounds for relief.
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clear from the Garcia decision is whether plain error or
exceptional circumstances were in fact raised at the appeal court
by Garcia.
Petitioner argues infra that the 3-month statute of
limitations in Utah Code § 78-12-31.1 is unconstitutional under
the Utah Constitution Article I Sections 1, 5, 7, 11, and 26, and
that it is plain error for the trial court to dismiss Gibson's
petition in violation of his constitutional rights.
Petitioner further argues that raising the constitutionality
of the 3-month statute of limitations in § 78-12-31.1 at the trial
court would not have been remedial since the trial court is
obliged to follow the plain language of the statute.

It is the

statute itself that is wrong.
2

Does the three-month statute of limitations contained in
Utah Code § 78-12-31.1 violate Utah Constitution Article I
Sections 1, 5, 7, 11, and 26.

2a

Utah Constitution Article I Section 1
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and
protect property; ... protest against wrongs, and petition for
redress of grievances ...
Application of this section to a liberty interest may be an

issue of first impression.

Case law focuses on how property

interests are protected the same as life/liberty interests,
however, the analysis used by the court in reviewing a protected
property interest is persuasive for analysis of a liberty interest
protected in the same section.
In Block v. Schwartz 76 P. 22, 24-25 (Utah 1904) (fraudulent
sale statute) the court said:
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These constitutional provisions [Utah Constitution Article I
Sections 1 and 7] constitute the supreme law of the
commonwealth upon this subject. To that law the executive,
the legislative, and the judicial departments of the
government alike must bow obedience, as well as every subject.
It forbids the abridgment by the state of the privileges and
immunities of all citizens. Under its mandate no person can
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, and every person is entitled to the equal protection
of the laws, and may acquire property, posses and protect it,
as well as defend his life and liberty. These are inherent
and inalienable rights of citizens, and are constitutional
guaranties. An enactment, therefore, which deprives a person
arbitrarily of his property, or of some part of his personal
liberty, is just as much inhibited by the supreme law as one
which would deprive him of life.
The court said in Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 284 P2d 702,
705 (Utah 1955) (anti-price advertising of eyeglasses statute)
citing Backman v. Bateman 263 P2d 561, 563 (Utah 1953) (antinepotism statute) see also Pride Oil Company v. Salt Lake County
370 P2d 355, 356 (Utah 1962) (deceptive advertising):
In judging the propriety of this enactment, we must take into
consideration the balance between the alleged evil sought to
be corrected and the limitation on constitutional rights the
ordinance would impose. In reference to the use of the police
power for such a purpose, this Court has said: "There must
exist an evil of a substantial nature, the correction of which
would serve the public welfare * * *."
In this case petitioner's liberty interest protected by Utah
Constitution Article I Section 1 is being unduly compromised by
the 3-month statute of limitations in § 78-12-31.1. Petitioner,
from his prison cell, without aid of counsel or access to a law
library, is expected to file suit to protect rights that arose
from the Foote decision within 3-months or lose them forever. This
is not just.

This is not constitutional.

Application of this

limit here is especially heinous because the evil the state is
protecting the "public" from is complaint of abuse by the state
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The state, by legislative fiat, is using a statute of

limitations as a form of immunity to protect itself from the
fallout of the Foote decision.
2b

Utah Constitution Article I Section 5
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the
public safety requires it.
This writ cannot be abrogated or its efficiency curtailed by
legislative action. Cases within the relief afforded by it
cannot, until the people voluntarily surrender their right to
this greatest of all writs by an amendment of the organic law,
be placed beyond its reach and remedial action. The privilege
of the writ cannot even be temporarily suspended, except for
the safety of the state, except for rebellion or invasion.2
More recently Justice Stewart said in Hurst v. Cook 777 P2d

1029, 1033 (Utah 1989) (sexual abuse of a child):
Historically, the Writ has played such a large role in the
history of our law that it has received specific
constitutional protection. The Declaration of Rights of the
Utah Constitution, Article I, section 5, expressly prohibits
restrictions on the availability of the Writ except "when the
public safety requires it.
Judges Garff, Billings and Davidson in Hatch v. Deland 790 P2d
49 (Utah App. 1990) (Per Curiam) found unconstitutional the
state's attempt to immunize itself from the courts with Utah Code
§ 77-27-5(3) (decisions of the Board of Pardons are final and are
not subject to judicial review).

The court reversed the trial

court saying "The right to petition for habeas corpus based on
violation of substantial constitutional rights is guaranteed by
Utah Constitution.11

Id at 50.

In re Dill 5 P. 39, 45 (Kansas 1884) quoting
Liscomb 60 N.Y. 559

People

v.
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Justice Zimmerman in Smith v. Cook 803 P2d 788, 796 (Utah
1990) (probation revoked after probationary period expired)
(concurring opinion) speaking specifically to § 78-12-31.1 said
"I do not think the legislature can validly impose a three-month
limitation period on habeas corpus actions."
The language of article I, section 5 is clear, plain and
unambiguous; it forbids suspension of the writ.

When you add the

weight of section 1 (inherent and inalienable rights) and section
2 6 (mandatory and prohibitory) to section 5 it is hard to see how
any statute of limitation on habeas corpus could satisfy the Utah
Constitution.
2c

Utah Constitution Article I Section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
This section empowers the court.

In Condemarin v. University

Hospital 775 P2d 348, 357 (Utah 1989) (statute imposing limits on
amount person could claim against uninsured government entity) the
court said:
We are required to assess the reasonableness of the
legislative expansion of government immunity contained in
section 63-30-10 against the degree of intrusion on rights
protects by the Utah Constitution. That is the essence of the
requirement of due process under our constitution. See Utah
Const, art. I, § 7.
What is the 3-month statute of limitations in § 78-12-31.1 if
not an expansion of government immunity?

What is the state doing

here except protecting itself from it's own bad acts?
there be due process in so short a period of time?

How can
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Utah Constitution Article I Section 11
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have a
remedy by due course of law ...
In Condemarin the court found provisions of the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code §§ 63-30, unconstitutional
under article I section 11. The court conducted a "means-end
review" to insure that "legislative action be rationally related
to the accomplishment of some legitimate state purpose."

The

court said a rationality requirement was "the most minimal of
constitutional limitations on legislative action."

Id at 356.

In Condemarin the court followed a two part test first
articulated in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 717 P2d 670, 680
(Utah 1985) (statute of repose).

First, does the law provide an

effective and reasonable alternative remedy?

Second, if not then

abrogation must be justified by "clear social or economic evil"
and may not be an "arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving
the objective."

Condemarin at 357-58, see also Avis v. Board of

Review 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 58 (Utah App. 1992) (protection from
stale claims is a legitimate legislative purpose for three year
statute of limitation).
Since petitioner's rights are being cut off, no alternative
state remedy is available (first prong) therefore under Berry
there must be a clear social or economic evil (second prong).
Here the only evil is that the state might have to defend against
inmate claims.

Even if avoiding the cost of defense is a

legitimate state purpose, a 3-month statute of limitations is
arbitrary and unreasonable (second prong part two).

It is
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unreasonable to expect prisoners to be able to coordinate the
necessary resources to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus
in so short a period of time.
2e

Utah Constitution Article I Section 26
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be
otherwise.
Similar to section 7, argued supra, this section empowers the

court.

In Berry at 67 6 the court said:

Article I, section 2 6 rivets section 11, and all the other
rights in the Declaration of Rights, into the fundamental law
of the State and makes them enforceable in a court of law.
Article I, section 2 6 declares that "the provisions of this
constitution are mandatory and prohibitory unless by express
words they are declared to be otherwise."
3

Was the court correct in dismissing petitioner's habeas corpus
petition for hearing dates prior to April 27, 1987,
In Garcia this court quoted the compiler's notes to Utah Code

§ 78-12-31.1 saying "the amendment to this section, deleting a
reference to imprisonment as a disability, applies only to causes
of action that arise after April 27, 1987 and has no retroactive
application."

Id at 4, (emphasis added).

Gibson had six Board hearings3 prior to April 27, 1987. The
trial court should not have dismissed Gibson's petition for those
hearing dates.

Gibson's right to petition for a writ of habeas

corpus for those dates is protected by the pre-1987 Utah Code
§ 78-12-3 6 (disability of incarceration) since the 1987 amendment
has no retroactive affect, Smith v. Cook 803 at 790.
3

Jan 28/87, Feb 13/85, Mar 31/82, Apr 23/80,
Dec 18/74, Jul 16/73
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
It was plain error for the trial court to dismiss Gibson's
petition since the 3-month statue of limitations in Utah Code
§ 78-12-31.1 violates Gibson's Utah Constitutional rights by
restricting his rights to habeas corpus relief.
Even if the tirial court were correct in dismissing Gibson's
petition for review of his Parol Board hearings occurring after
April 27, 1987, the trial court was in error for dismissing
Gibson's petition for review of his Parol Board hearings occurring
before April 27, 1987 since the change in the law was not
retroactive.
Gibson prays for release from confinement, for the trial court
to hear his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and for this court
to rule that Utah code § 78-21-31.1 is unconstitutional.
Mar 15/93 Mon
by
Michael L. Adkins, Esq
for Petitioner/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing
BRIEF
was delivered on Mar 15/93 Mon
to Lorenzo K. Miller, Esq
Assistant Utah Attorney General
330 South 3 00 East
SLC Utah 84111
575-1600
by
Michael L. Adkins, Esq
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PILED
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

*>Wm K Nconan
OBJk<tf,the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

Lee Garcia,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 910298-CA

Lynn Jorgenson, Warden Young
Adult Correction Facility;
Gary W. Deland, Executive
Director, Utah State
Department of Corrections;
Gerald Cook, Director of
Institutional Operations, Utah
State Department of
Corrections; H.L. "Pete11 Haun,
Chairman, Utah State Board of
Pardons; William Peters,
member, Utah State Board of
Pardons; Don Blanchard,
member, Utah State Board of
Pardons,

F I L E D
(May 18, 1992)

Respondents and Appellees.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
Attorneys:

Jay Fitt, Orem, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Lorenzo K. Miller, Salt Lake
City, for Appellees

Before Judges Orme, Bench and Billings.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner appeals the trial court's dismissal of his
complaint for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
On February 26, 199 0, petitioner was convicted of theft and
sentenced to serve one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
On February 26, 1990, the Utah Board of Pardons held a hearing to
determine a possible parole date for petitioner. Only two board
members were present and concluded plaintiff could receive a

tentative parole date of May 25, 1993. The three member board
later issued an order, on December 4, 1990, granting appellant a
parole date of January 25, 1994.
On March 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming the board of pardons violated his
rights of due process and equal protection. The State filed a
motion to dismiss claiming, among other things, that the
complaint was barred by the statute of limitations contained in
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992). On April 26, 1991, the court
granted the motion to dismiss on the basis that the claim was
time barred by operation of section 78-12-31.1.
On appeal, petitioner claims the trial court erred in
dismissing the complaint on the basis of the statute of
limitations. First, he claims that section 78-12-31.1 does not
apply because section 78-12-31.1 involves habeas corpus petitions
and he filed a complaint for post-conviction relief. Rule 65B of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as it existed in March of 1991
when the complaint was filed, provided that fl[s]pecial forms of
pleadings and of writs in habeas corpus, mandamus . . . and other
extraordinary writs, as heretofore known, are hereby abolished.11
Rule 65B(f) states that
[appropriate relief by habeas corpus
proceedings shall be granted whenever it
appears to the proper court that any person
is unjustly imprisoned or otherwise
restrained of his liberty. If the person
seeking relief is imprisoned in the
penitentiary and asserts that in the
proceedings which resulted in his conviction
there was a substantial denial of his rights
under the Constitution of the United State or
under the Constitution of the State of Utah,
or both, then the person seeking such relief
shall proceed in accordance with Rule 65B(i).
In all other cases, proceedings under this
subdivision shall be conducted in accordance
with the following provisions . . . .
Rule 65B(i), entitled "postconviction hearings,ff provides
that
any person imprisoned in the penitentiary
. . . under a commitment of any court,
whether such imprisonment be under the
original commitment or under a commitment for
violation of probation or parole, who asserts
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that in any proceeding which resulted in his
commitment there was a substantial denial of
his rights under the Constitution of the
United States or of the State of Utah, or
both, may institute a proceeding under this
rule.
(Emphasis added.)
Rule 65B(f) addresses all proceedings except claims
regarding the proceedings resulting in the conviction. Rule
65B(i), on the other hand, appears to address claims involving
original commitment or a commitment due to a violation of
probation or parole. The present case involves a claim regarding
petitioner's parole hearing. Because the claim does not involve
the proceedings resulting in the conviction, we conclude that
65B(f)i applies and the complaint constitutes a habeas corpus
"fTetTtibn. We therefore reject petitioner's claim that section %812-31.1 does not apply because his pleading was not a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner also claims that even if section 78-12-31.1
applies, the statute of limitations was tolled during his period
of incarceration pursuant to Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah
1990). In Smith, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the State's
claim that the three month statute of limitations contained in
section 78-12-31.1 should not be tolled by the disability of
incarceration provision in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1977).
Section 78-12-3 6, before it was amended in 1987, provided that
ff
[i]f a person entitled to bring an action . . . is at the time
the cause of action accrued either . . . imprisoned on a criminal
charge or in execution under the sentence of a criminal
. . . the time of the disability is not part of the time limited
for the commencement of an action." Appellant was imprisoned in
1984 and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 1988.
In addressing appellee's claim that the disability of
incarceration should not apply to habeas corpus actions, the
court stated that appellee's claim was contrary to the clear
language of section 78-12-3 6. The court further stated that "any
ambiguity that may exist in sections 78-12-36 and 78-12-31.1
should be resolved in favor of the criminal defendant." Smith,
803 P.2d at 791. Therefore, the court held that the habeas
corpus petition was not barred by section 78-12-31.1.
As noted in Smith, section 78-12-31.1 was amended in 1987
and now provides "[i]f a person entitled to bring an action,
other than for the recovery of real property, is at the time the
cause of action accrued, either under the age of majority or
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time of
the disability is not a part of the time limited for the
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commencement of the action." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1992).
The compiler's notes to section 78-12-3 6 suggest "that the
amendment to this section, deleting a reference to imprisonment
as a disability, applies only to causes of action that arise
after April 27, 1987 and has no retroactive application!"
Therefore, pursuant to Smith and in accordance with the
compiler's notes, we conclude that those seeking habeas corpus
relief must comply with the three month statute of limitations
contained in section 78-12-31.1 unless their cause of action
arose before April 27, 1987.
In this case, appellant's cause of action arose in 1990 when
the board of pardons issued its order. Therefore, section 78-1231.1 applies. Section 78-12-31.1 states: "[w]ithin three
months: For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. This
limitation shall apply not only as to grounds known to petitioner
but also to grounds which in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have been known by petitioner or counsel for petitioner."
In this case, appellant complained of the board of pardons's
December 4, 1990 order in his March 20, 1991 complaint for post
conviction relief. Because the complaint was not filed within
the three-month period, we find no error in the trial court's
dismissal of the complaint on the basis that it was barred by
section 78-12-31.1.
Finally, petitioner claims section 78-12-31.l"is
unconstitutional. It is well-settled that this court does not
review constitutional issues for the first time on appeal absent
plain error or exceptional circumstances. State v. Archambeau,
880 P.2d 920, 923-25 (Utah App. 1991). The record contains no
indication that petitioner raised the constitutionality of the
statute below. We therefore decline to address the issue for the
first time on appeal.
We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus on the basis that it was barred by the
statute of limitations contained in section 78-12-31.1.

Orme, Judge

f<^U^CC M M&^L
Russell W. Bench, Judge

Judith M. Billings, Judge
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